A comparative study of ethnic identity among Azerbaijani speakers in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan by Khalili, Mostafa
  
 
'The paper has been reviewed by at least one anonymous referee and the editor of the journal'. 
 
Abstract 
In 1828, Azerbaijan was divided between the Persian and Russian empires through the Turkmenchay treaty. 
From 1920, the northern part was joined to the Soviet Union as the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, until its 
independence in 1991. Having been governed by the Soviet Union for a long time, residents of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan are strongly influenced by Russian culture, while residents of Azerbaijan provinces 
of Iran have been under the influence of Persian culture, literature and politics. This article, inspired by 
Edward Said’s definition of “otherness”, argues that the perception of “others” has developed differently 
for the Azerbaijani identity in these two geopolitically separated areas. North Azerbaijanis define their 
ethnic identity and nationalistic movements as a reaction and in opposition to Armenians. Iranian 
Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, live in peace with a large Armenian diaspora, and thus instead define their 
identity by emphasis on their rights under Persian governance. Using the constructionism theory of Stuart 
Hall, the paper argues that Azerbaijani identity has been redefined in two Southern and Northern forms in a 
fluid and contingent way of “becoming” rather than “being”. An ethnographic observation of the everyday 
lives of the two ethnic groups showed that other than history and language ties, the vast range of cultural, 
economic and political differences have shaped two different ethnic identities. Interviews with the recently 
increasing number of tourist visitors to both South and North Azerbaijan demonstrated that the two have a 
pessimistic perception about one another and believe that their own path towards modernization is the right 
one, but not the other. Nationalistic movements among Iranian Azerbaijanis represent a struggle to 
overcome discrimination, and in extreme cases, a demand for secessionism. They cannot, however, 
conceive of themselves in unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan either. In conclusion, I suggest a 
redefinition of Azerbaijani identity as two entities sharing a common language and history. 
  Keywords: Azerbaijani, Ethnic identity, Identity construction, Iranian Azerbaijani, Otherness, Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
Introduction  
Two consecutive wars between Persian and Russian Empires, ended in signing the two treaties of Gulistan 
and Turkmenchay in 1813 and 1828, respectively. These treaties, which were major defeats for the Persian 
Empire, caused a tragic division between the large Azerbaijani populations on the two sides of a new border. 
Some contacts continued between the peoples of the disjointed areas, but this stopped with North 
Azerbaijan’s incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1920 and the formation of the Azerbaijan Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Swietochowski, 1995). After that, the setting up of a system of border guards made it too 
difficult for people to pass through the border, and any attempt to communicate with people from non-
socialist countries was subject to severe punishment (Matthews, 1989:195). Thus, until 1991 when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, there were almost no relations between the Azerbaijani people on the two sides of the 
border. In such a desperate situation, many despondent poems and dramas about the virtually insurmountable 
border were written on both sides.  
After the proclamation of independence in September 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
entered a bloody war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Even after the ceasefire in 1994, both 
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countries have continued to claim the region, and this contentious conflict has caused enormous hatred 
between citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following the war, the Republic of Azerbaijan 
was divided into two separated parts, disjointed by Armenian territory. As Armenia disconnected the routes 
to the enclaved part, the residents of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic were isolated from the mainland. 
This separation has caused major problems for these citizens, who have had to pass through Iran to reach the 
other part of their homeland, which is troublesome and costly. 
In 2015, the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan was estimated at more than 9.5 million, 91.6% of 
which belonged to Azerbaijani ethnicity (Population census 2015). On the other side of the border with Iran, 
Iranian Azerbaijanis comprise the largest population of ethnic Azerbaijanis in the world. Being the dominant 
ethnicity in the Northwest of Iran, they live in three provinces of East and West Azerbaijan and Ardabil 
(Figure 1). They are the largest minority in Iran, comprising about 24% of the total population, with many 
living in other Iranian provinces. Many cities including Zanjan, Qazvin, and Hamadan have a large 
Azerbaijani population. Some Azerbaijanis have migrated to the Iranian capital Tehran, and other nearby 
cities such as Karaj, since long ago. In smaller numbers, they live in other Iranian provinces such 
as Kurdistan, Gilan, Markazi and Kermanshah (Shaffer, 2002: 221-225). There is still an intensive debate 
among Persian and Iranian Azerbaijani elites on how Iranian Azerbaijanis should be called. However, 
Persians and Azerbaijanis themselves commonly use the term “Turks” to refer to Iranian Azerbaijanis 
(pronounced as Tork in Persian). The term “Azeri” is not considered as correct by many academic scholars, 
but may be used by Iranians in formal conversations (Kasravi, 1946).   
 
 
Figure 1.  Iranian Azerbaijanis in northwest provinces of Iran. (Source: Geography from GMMS 2011, Global 
Mapping International Language Locations from World Language Mapping System 2011) 
 
This study focuses on the conflicts and tensions surrounding the imagined and articulated identity 
among Azerbaijani people. To that end I will draw on the understanding of identity formation in cultural 
studies, particularly as described by Stuart Hall, and a broad spectrum of constructionist views applied to the 
analysis of ethnicity and nationalism. I shall first present a brief theoretical summary in order to situate my 
study within the methodological practice of constructionism and the intellectual tradition of cultural studies.  
Methodology  
The primary data for this paper was collected in three demographically diverse regions, including the 
northwest of Iran, especially the city of Tabriz, various cities in the Republic of Azerbaijan and some cities 
in Iran with a dominant Persian population including Tehran, Karaj and Qom, where many Azerbaijani 
diaspora live. Being born and raised in the city of Tabriz, which is the most populated Azerbaijani city in 
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Iran, I had been searching for the origins of my ethnicity on the other side of the border. However, most of 
existing literature on the ethnic identity of Iranian Azerbaijanis has been influenced by a strong Iranian 
nationalistic view. Beyond the dominant political presumptions and common historical speculations, there is 
a lack of ethnographic research studies on this issue. Therefore, I needed to first discover the perception of 
ordinary people about their identity and what they believed they shared with the so-called “co-ethnics” living 
on the other side of the border.  
Starting from October 2009 until April 2012, while living in Tabriz and also as a sojourner to the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, I collected the primary data for this paper as a participant observer. In the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, by making friends in public places like universities, museums and bars, I gradually entered 
into the family and social life of indigenous people. In the beginning, they would usually guide me in the city 
and introduce me to historical and cultural places, but over time I was permitted into their everyday life, 
staying in their homes as a guest and participating in their marriage, mourning or religious ceremonies. 
Sometimes, I would stay and participate for more than a week in local marriage ceremonies as a close friend.  
Often, I came to know many people from various social classes through snowball sampling. During this 
period, I conducted qualitative interviews with many Azerbaijanis of different ages including some who had 
never crossed the border of Iran as well as tourists, sojourners, and businessmen who regularly traveled to 
Iran. The interviewee’s ages ranged from 20 to 70 years old. In most cases, I first built a friendly connection 
with the younger participants, interviewed them, and then asked them to introduce me to the other members 
of their family and acquaintances. While it was not difficult to find a way to enter into an Azerbaijani family 
circle, being a single young boy, I did not have any chance to interview young girls due to cultural norms. 
During my short stay in their houses, the female members of the family rarely showed up. 
However, in Azerbaijan of Iran, as an indigenous researcher, data collection was much easier for me. I 
interviewed many people in Tabriz, in the same age range of 20 to 70 years old, as well as several members 
of ethnic/nationalistic movements in Azerbaijan of Iran. Being a part of the society, I did not face any 
limitation in collecting data from female participants in Tabriz except for a few traditional religious families. 
During data collection, one of the best places to find interviewees was the visa application queue in front of 
the building of consulate general of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tabriz. I interviewed many people there, 
like businessmen, students who were studying at a university in the city of Baku (capital city of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan) and some tourists who had never traveled there before. From July 2012 to June 2013, I lived 
in Tehran, and was in close contact with Iranian Azerbaijanis who migrated there more than 30 years before. 
In Tehran, too, it was easy to arrange interviews with Azerbaijani ethnic people I knew or found in 
Azerbaijani populated neighborhoods. Iranian Azerbaijanis living in Persian dominant cities were eager to 
talk about their identity issues. I interviewed various people about their ethnic conflicts as diaspora living in 
Tehran. I also traveled to some nearby cities like Karaj and Qom to observe the circumstances of 
Azerbaijanis there. 
After that, for one more year until the end of 2014, I returned to Tabriz to make contact with the flood 
of medical tourists from the Republic of Azerbaijan who travelled from Baku and other cities to Tabriz. 
Acting as an Iranian guide for some of them, I would follow their treatment procedures in Tabriz. Whether in 
informal daily conversations or in formal interviews, I would ask questions about their perception of the 
ethnicity of Iranian Azerbaijanis. 
Theoretical Framework: Cultural research can challenge the relatively stable, coherent and unitary notion of 
ethnic identity. Cultural studies have conceived identity formation as relational, contextual and never fully 
formed but always under transformation. Frantz Fanon first introduced to ethnic studies the idea of identity 
as relational through the psychoanalytic concept of the “others” when he recalled how the gaze of the 
‘other’, a white child pointing her finger at him and telling her mother “look, a Negro!”, framed him as a 
‘black’ man (Fanon, 1967). A similar situation has existed for Iranian Azerbaijanis since the Pahlavi dynasty 
when the ‘other’ groups started using the derogatory term of “tork donkey” to refer to them, ascribing a 
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stereotyped feature of dumbness to Azerbaijanis. 
Edward Said maintains that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off 
against the Orient” adding that European cultural hegemony established itself by positing a European 
identity superior to all others (Said, 1979). Said explains the notion of ‘otherness’ by considering social 
identity through the construction of opposites and ‘others’. The actuality of others is always subject to the 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’; far from a static thing then, the 
identity of self or of the ‘others’ follows a historical, social, intellectual, and political process as part of a 
contest which involves individuals and institutions in all societies. Unlike the “naive belief in the certain 
positivity and unchanging historicity of a culture, a self, and national identity”, Said observes insightfully 
that “human identity is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even invented 
outright” (Said, 1979). In the following parts, I shall discuss how the notion of ‘otherness’ has been 
established so differently for Azerbaijani ethnics in different parts of Iran, compared with the citizens of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan.  
Stuart Hall for his part draws on Fanon and Said as well as Marx, Freud, Derrida, Gramsci, and 
Althusser, among others, to conceptualize identity as fluid, relational and contingent (Hall, 1996). To engage 
in the question of culture and power, domination and resistance, cultural studies complicate identity as a 
matter of becoming rather than being, an arbitrary closure, and an “invention” always created under social 
pressure. Our identity is not inexorably tied to our past, real or imaginary; rather, it is subject to the 
continuous play of history, culture, and power. There is no single, stable, or homogenous ethnic or national 
identity. It is contingent and structured by social formations (Hall, 1990). 
I shall argue in the following sections that Hall’s explanation of fluid identity could illustrate the current 
social and cultural variations between three different “Turk” ethnicities living in Turkey, Iranian Azerbaijan 
and the Republic of Azerbaijan’s citizens. The descriptive view of everyday life in various Azerbaijani and 
Turkish cities, and people’s perception of being Turk is far different in these areas, especially when 
compared with the three countries referred in this paper. I will argue that the view of contemporary 
nationalistic movements, especially in the city of Tabriz, which aim to define Azerbaijanis and Turks as a 
holistic nation is in contrast with people’s perception in everyday life in different Turk-Azerbaijani areas, 
since culture, politics and the definition of “otherness” in each Azerbaijani area is far different from others. 
Yuet Cheung (1993: 1216) defines ethnic identification as “the psychological attachment to an ethnic 
group or heritage, an affiliative construct, where an individual is viewed by themselves and by others as 
belonging to a particular ethnic or cultural group”. An individual can choose to associate with a group 
especially if other choices are available and thus centers the construct in the domain of self-perception (i.e. 
Iranian, Azerbaijani or Turkish ethnicities in the case of Iranian Azerbaijanis). Affiliation can be influenced 
by racial, natal, symbolic, and cultural factors (Cheung, 1993). 
The image and perception that one has from his group identity is not innate but shaped gradually and 
through his lived experience. Each society has its own system of group identity. In some societies, family 
connection is emphasized more in shaping the identity, while in others geographic connection (place of 
origin) or religion is emphasized more. Which factor becomes the most dominant and significant in shaping 
the identity is largely dependent on various circumstances (smith, 1991). 
In the modern world, usually the most important group identity is the country of citizenship. This 
identity type is associated with legal rights and responsibilities under the constitution of the country. In the 
complicated process of nation-building in every country, many factors affect the final formation and 
geographic-population coverage of each nation. This is why many transnational human groups have existed. 
Where the drawn “national borders” had been determined by many factors, even accidents in some cases, 
once the “border” was drawn, the system would follow the government’s direction. Gradually the “border” 
would become significant not only administratively but also economically and culturally (Tiankui, Sasaki 
and Peilin, 2013). In the last part of this paper, I have discussed about how the nation-building process of the 
post-Soviet Azerbaijan and post Islamic revolution Iran have influenced their Azerbaijani speaking citizens.  
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Findings and Discussion 
Otherness for Iranian Azerbaijanis: For most Iranian Azerbaijanis questioning their own self-conceived 
ethnic identity has been a significant and difficult issue in identity formation. During my research travels to 
non-Azerbaijani dominant cities of Iran, or while living in Tehran, I could barely remember anyone who did 
not react to my Azerbaijani accent while speaking to them in Persian as my second language. It appeared as 
if Persians needed to choose a certain stance on this widespread ethnic group. Almost all people in the 
capital would somehow react to Azerbaijani speaking people. The most common reaction would be to 
recognize the odd accent and ask which Azerbaijani city one is from, or to use some metaphors in a sarcastic 
way to express their view of “how dumb or intelligent” Azerbaijani people are. It seemed that everyone 
needed to somehow react “differently” when they met Azerbaijanis; most of the time, they started a 
conversation by saying how good, hospitable, and intelligent ethnic Azerbaijani are, but after feeling more 
intimate, they might move the dialogue to some sarcastic description of Azerbaijani people. In extreme 
cases, during arguments between two Persian and Azerbaijani persons, it was common to hear the ethnic slur 
Turkish (Azerbaijani) people. Iranians, I spoke to, usually call Azerbaijani people as “Tork” and some may 
even question whether Azerbaijani ethnic people are truly Iranian. In everyday language of Persians, “Tork” 
is a sarcastic metaphor for a dumb or stupid person. This metaphor has become so popular that sometimes 
even Azerbaijani people too, may use it when a friend makes a funny mistake.  
Facing such ethnic harassment has caused many Iranian Azerbaijanis, especially those living in Tehran 
and other Persian speaking cities, to be highly sensitive about their ethnic identity. Although Persians living 
in different cities of Iran have their own local accent in speech, they are considered as belonging to “us” by 
other Persians.  
Otherness for the Republic of Azerbaijan’s citizens: A significant feature that distinguishes Iranian 
Azerbaijanis from those of the Republic of Azerbaijan is their paradoxical attitude towards Armenians. 
Following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, from the late 
1980s to 1994 the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan assume Armenians as their sworn enemy, who 
committed atrocities in Karabakh city. However, Iranian Azerbaijanis never considered that war as their 
own, and have hosted a quite big Armenian diaspora living in peace for a long time in the city of Tabriz. 
Armenians live in one of the famous and rich neighborhoods of the city. Although their culture, religion, 
ethnicity and “blood” are far different from other citizens of Tabriz, they have been treated well in this city 
for a long time. Therefore, one of the major critics of Azerbaijani people in the Republic of Azerbaijan is 
questioning why Iranian people and government, especially their “brothers” in Iran who knew about the 
atrocities, keep good relations with Armenia and Armenians, their most hated enemy (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Nagorna Karabakh region: The conflicted area between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
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Every time I asked my Armenian friends whom I knew for a long time since high school or university, 
they expressed their satisfaction with how Tabriz citizens treated them as members of a diaspora in the city. 
However, this causes Azerbaijanis from the Republic of Azerbaijan to look down on their “brothers and 
sisters” in Tabriz. They believe that even if Iran’s government has good relations with Armenia, Iranian 
Azerbaijanis should not let them stay in Azerbaijani speaking territories. Iranian Azerbaijanis sometimes 
travel to Armenia for pleasure and to enjoy more public freedom; however, Azerbaijanis living there despise 
such behavior. When they want to make closer friends with Iranian Azerbaijanis, they commonly ask them 
whether they have been to Armenia or not. If the answer is “yes” they commonly decide not to have a close 
friendship. Even in political relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the issue of Armenia 
plays a significant role. Whenever Iran wants to share cultural events or enhance economic relations with 
Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan’s government reacts by downgrading its relations with Iran.  
Since Armenia closed the routes to a separated part of the Republic of Azerbaijan territory after the war, 
people of the smaller part, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, became isolated. Thus they feel the effects of 
politics in their everyday life much more than the residents of the larger country. In my first trip to 
Nakhchivan in 2007, I was surprised when a young student asked me if he could find some Armenian girls in 
Tabriz to rape because he hated all Armenians. In another case, I met a medical student who wanted to 
become a military doctor to serve in a probabilistic future war between the two countries. In contrast, many 
Armenians in Iran settled mainly in Tabriz and Isfahan among other Iranian cities a long time ago, built 
some churches in conservative Shia cities of Tabriz and Isfahan, and enjoyed a peaceful life for many years. 
In Tabriz, they are even famous for being an honest, truthful and hardworking minority.  
Otherness for Turkish people: It has been a subject of debate for a long time whether or not Azerbaijani 
people, in Iran or the Republic of Azerbaijan, are originally Turks. Recently, especially after Turkey sped up 
the process of modernizing the country, while Iran and Azerbaijan are still lagging behind, Azerbaijani 
people in both the Republic of Azerbaijan and all the widespread diaspora tend to consider themselves of 
“Turkish ethnicity”. There is a similar sentiment among Turkmen and Uzbek people. Some historical debates 
suggest that all Turks including Turkish people, Azerbaijanis, Turkmens and even some ethnic groups in 
eastern China used to belong to a larger nation that was once called “Turkistan”. They are thus searching for 
a way to prove that originally they were of the same ethnicity.  
However, since Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan were not under the Ottoman Empire for a long 
time, this left a gap between them and the Turks living in contemporary Turkey. The current demography in 
most Eastern parts of Turkey is dominated by the Kurdish ethnicity which is far different from Azerbaijanis 
as well as other ethnicities in Iran. This fact has resulted in a situation where Iranians and Azerbaijanis find a 
completely different culture and language in the area across the Turkish border. Thus, there is a vast 
geographical area, occupied by Kurds, between Azerbaijanis and Turkish people belonging to Turkey 
(Figure 3). However, most Turkish citizens call Azerbaijani people as their brother, sharing the same blood 
and ethnicity with them.   
While in a close relationship with many Turkish citizens, especially in Istanbul, I found few people who 
knew that a large Azerbaijani diaspora live in Iran. For Turks in Turkey, there is not much difference 
between Azerbaijanis in Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan; they find both groups of ethnic Azerbaijanis 
very close to themselves, and as speaking in a dialect of Turkish. However, in contemporary politics, Turks 
face serious conflicts with Kurdish residents of Turkey, and the most important issue for them is defending 
their territorial integrity and ethnicity against Kurdish secession. One could see significant discrimination 
against Kurdish people in Turkey, similar to ethnic discrimination against Azerbaijanis in Iran. Even though 
Turkish citizens respect their Azerbaijani brothers, they seem reluctant to participate in any nationalistic 
movement to support Iranian Azerbaijanis or against Armenia in favor of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Aiming to join the European Union as soon as possible, they want to look to the West rather than get 
involved in another ethnic conflict in Iran or the Republic of Azerbaijan. We may interpret their attitude 
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towards Azerbaijanis as neither rejecting nor accepting them. Instead, the nationalistic movements in Turkey 
define themselves as anti-Kurdish with the purpose of having a pure Turkish territory, but not aiming to have 
a united territory with Azerbaijanis or other ethnic groups who consider themselves originally Turks. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Kurdish inhabited areas in four nearby countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. (Source: CIA fact sheet) 
 
As Edward Said points out on defining ethnicity with the concept of “otherness”, one could see that 
three different “others” exist for the Turkish-Azerbaijani ethnicity. The Republic of Azerbaijan citizens 
define their ethnic identity as being different from Armenians. Iranian Azerbaijanis define their ethnicity 
under domination by Persians in Iran, and Turkish citizens shape their ethnic interest in response to the 
Kurdish threat, eager to define themselves as Europeans rather than Asians. So the three ethnic groups are 
fighting on three different fronts to gain an identity while each front seems to be independent from the 
others. Sometimes one ethnicity appears even to be helping the other groups’ enemies in so called conflicts 
of “us against them”. 
Cultural fission, shaping different ethnic identities under Persian and Russian domination: During 
frequent travels to the Republic of Azerbaijan and while in contact with Iranian tourists there, I realized that 
Iranians usually were asked lots of questions about various cultural and political issues in Iran. Once I was in 
a wedding ceremony of a friend in Nakhchivan, thinking about differences in wedding customs and 
ceremonies in Tabriz and Nakhchivan, when the DJ played a “Persian song” for me as their “dearest Iranian 
guest” and asked me to perform a “Persian dance” for them. I was very surprised, since we always define 
ourselves as Azerbaijani rather that Iranian; when I am in a non-Azerbaijani city in Iran in a wedding, I am 
asked to perform an Azerbaijani dance. One could easily see that even though citizens of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan call Iranian Azerbaijanis as their brothers and sisters, they still believe that Iranian Azerbaijanis 
are Iranians who follow the Persian culture, not Azerbaijani.   
 The complete separation of Iran and Azerbaijan since 1828 after the treaty of Turkmenchay and 
spending more than seventy years under the domination of the Soviet Union has radically influenced the 
culture, language, religion and social values of people in the Republic of Azerbaijan while a similar situation 
occurred for Iranian Azerbaijanis under Persian rule. Nevertheless, sharing the same language and folklore 
plays a significant role in keeping the ties strong between them. In the following part, I am going to look at 
some of these similarities and differences between the two cultures. 
Language is of central importance to ethnic identity, and it has been argued that language can work to 
prime either the original or host cultural identities (Hong et. al, 2000). Azerbaijani language spoken in 
Republic of Azerbaijan has gone through hard times switching from one writing system to the other. With 
changing the script three times, from traditional Arabic to Latin, from Latin to Cyrillic, and going back to 
Latin again, reflects an identity crisis caused by the changing social and political situation in the country. 
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Each of these changes was applied either voluntarily or under political pressure to shape the national identity 
of the country closer to the neighboring states. Yet these changes had benefits as well as challenges to the 
cohesion of Azerbaijani identity. Safizafeh (1998) describes the significant influence of these 
transformations on the identity of Azerbaijanis as: “How can you speak about the identity of a people whose 
alphabet has been changed four times in the last seventy-five years?” 
Following independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan changed their alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin 
aiming to get closer to Turkey, both culturally and politically. These consecutive changes between different 
alphabets have led to a recreation and reformation of many Arabic rooted words in these two languages. 
However, since both countries have their education in their own language, gradually they have set a standard 
to spelling of different words from Arabic. Moreover, they have already set a standard for words which were 
pronounced with different accents in different geographical areas. 
In Iranian Azerbaijan, the situation is far more complicated in terms of language and identity and quite 
unique. They speak in Azerbaijani, write in Persian and cite prayers in Arabic. However, their multilingual 
living has been challenged both internally and externally with either-or choices in the name of national 
identity or ethno-national consciousness (Safizadeh, 2013). Iranian people are educated in Persian using the 
Arabic script as in most other Islamic nations like the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan of the Russian empire 
up to 1928. However, Iranian Azerbaijanis never changed their script to Latin, even during a one year of 
declared independence from Iran under the name of Azerbaijan People’s Government from 1945 to 1946. 
Even today in Iran, the few books and magazines published in Azerbaijani, use Arabic alphabet. Iranian 
Azerbaijanis and especially the young generation receive no academic education in their mother tongue, so 
naturally they are confused when it comes to written communications. During my interviews, I found out 
that the situation has become more complicated since the rise of social media; they use computers with 
Arabic alphabet which lack specific characters in Turkish or Azerbaijani such as: “Ç Ğ İ Ö Ş Ü”. That is 
why they use English letters instead, but since there is no unified set of rules, nowadays, some Iranian 
Azerbaijanis prefer to speak in their mother tongue and write in social media fully in Persian to avoid any 
confusion. Moreover, since more vowels are used when writing with English letters compared to Arabic, it is 
easier to use English letters to show how a word is pronounced. This in turn can cause other problems such 
as emergence of different written versions of a single word due to different local accents. 
In spite of all these confusions, differences and difficulties, both ethnic groups in North and South 
Azerbaijan can still understand each other easily, even though their language has been highly influenced by 
the Russian, Persian and Arabic languages, respectively. This can be seen as an important cultural link 
between them. 
Hammond (1988) cites Durkheim noting that religion is a derivative of social circumstances that creates 
an enabling environment for involuntary acceptance of a way of life, especially as a consequence of group 
membership. For instance, people are made to manifest their sense of unity and belonging as a result of 
group membership through participation in rituals, ceremonies, belief systems or orientations and behavior 
towards symbols and objects perceived to be sacred and treated with sense of awe and wonder. Azerbaijanis 
both in the north and south follow the Shi’a branch of Islam; however, following the fall of the Soviet Union, 
a specific kind of vernacular Islam has been shaped in the Republic of Azerbaijan which is distinct from the 
Iranian version (Aliyeva, 2013). Such differences play a critical role on identity formation among Iranian 
Azerbaijanis who are known as conservative Shi’a Muslims in Iran, and are strongly influenced by the Shi’a 
definition of the post Islamic revolutionary Iran. Tabriz is one of the most conservative religious cities of 
Iran while Azerbaijanis of the Republic of Azerbaijan are not sensitive about Islamic regulations after being 
governed for a long time by the Soviet Union which discouraged religion. The Republic of Azerbaijan is still 
a secular country after independence. Few people in Baku or other cities of Azerbaijan would not drink 
alcohol because of Islamic rules. Their women, especially the young generation, rarely wear Hijab. There are 
mosques in cities and rural areas; however, their main usage is mostly for mourning and to conduct funeral 
ceremonies. People in their everyday life rarely go to mosque, except for a few clergies. During the month of 
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Ramadhan, restaurants are open and only a few people fast. However, in Tabriz, as well as other Azerbaijani 
cities of Iran, the majority of people are strictly religious. Most families are concerned about their women’s 
Hijab. If someone wants to drink alcohol, even if they have a chance to find it in Iran where the use of 
alcoholic drinks is prohibited, they drink in private with some close friends to avoid social persecution. 
In home decoration, fashion and clothes, and wearing of makeup, Iranian Azerbaijani women think that 
people in the Republic of Azerbaijan are lagging behind the modern world. They rarely follow the media of 
North Azerbaijan unless for some nostalgic films or songs, since they consider them as socially immature 
and pre-modern, while those in the Republic of Azerbaijani have the same conception about Iranian 
Azerbaijanis. I had several discussions with the young generation from Baku who judge Iran as a barbaric 
country ruled by Islamic clergies. They think that Iranians have no freedom, but their own country is secular 
and is a much better place to live compared with Iran.  
For me, before my frequent travels to the Republic of Azerbaijan, it was quite obvious that I was from a 
minority ethnicity with roots in the Republic of Azerbaijan. My mindset completely changed, however, when 
I travelled many times to the Republic of Azerbaijan and faced many differences in culture, politics and 
everyday life customs between the two. Interaction with neighboring countries through traveling is one of the 
most influential components of cultural assimilation for ethnic groups (Berger and Huntington, 2002). Since 
2008, the Iranian government has not required visa from citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan; so many 
Azerbaijani people are travelling to various Azerbaijani cities in Iran, mostly for medical care. Nowadays if 
one goes to any hospital or famous clinic, one will find at least some travelers from the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. Since there are not sufficient health services and good doctors in the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
the cost of treatment is higher in their home country than in Iran, they prefer to travel to Tabriz to find good 
doctors who speak their language, and to access inexpensive and high quality surgery or medication. 
However, they usually complain that Iran subsidizes treatment just for “Iranians” and not for “foreigners”. 
Although the treatment cost for Azerbaijanis is officially set by municipality at twice the usual fee of 
Iranians, most doctors charge foreign patients even up to five times more than Iranian nationals.   
Most Azerbaijanis are well aware of this issue and always complain about being cheated by ordinary 
people, doctors, in restaurants, hotels, by taxi drivers, exchange shops and almost by everyone, despite being 
their “brothers”. Most of them hire some driver/guide for a whole day from the border areas, who knows 
their dialect better than people in Tabriz, to help them translate in Persian or even in Azerbaijani language, as 
their language includes some Russian words. I interviewed some of them in a hotel in Tabriz where they 
expressed that for them it’s more economical to be charged by an escorting taxi driver for their whole trip in 
Tabriz rather than being charged by individual drivers. Azerbaijanis from Iran and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, while expressing complements and suggesting that they belong to the same ethnic group, same 
blood, and are brothers and sisters, still do not regard the “other” one as truly brother or sister.  
The first sojourners from Iranian Azerbaijanis to the Republic of Azerbaijan were some university 
students. Some rich Iranian Azerbaijani families, whose children failed to pass the difficult entrance exams 
of Iranian universities in engineering or medical sciences, send their children to rather expensive, low rank 
and low level educational universities in Baku and Nakhchivan which do not require an entrance 
examination for Iranians and foreigners. These students are well aware of the fact that the Iranian Ministry of 
Education will not recognize their diplomas as valid and they have to pass some requirements to get an 
equivalent valid diploma in Iran; however, they choose to study there since it is a good way to shortcut the 
entrance examination to dentistry or medicine or engineering in Iran. I have friends who are studying in 
those universities and usually do not want to speak about the situation in their universities, but when I asked 
from their Azerbaijani classmates, they told me that their professors take bribes to grade the students. They 
complain that to be a good student is not a matter of studying well, but of paying more.  
Iranian students there commonly complain that they are being cheated everywhere for being foreigners. 
They say that their landlords usually charge them more by bringing some unreal excuses. Taxi drivers or 
shopkeepers do not treat them well either. Iranian tourists, whether Azerbaijani or Persian, mostly complain 
 150 
 
Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies Volume 34, 2015-2016 
 
 
that the Republic of Azerbaijan is a country with a bureaucratic system based on bribery. During my own 
travels to the Republic of Azerbaijan, I was asked several times to pay a bribe to police for no reason. 
Sometimes when passing across the border, custom officers would ask passengers to pay a large amount of 
bribe; otherwise they would not have the permission to enter the country. The police are especially too strict 
with foreigners. I heard from people in front of the Republic of Azerbaijan consulate in Tabriz how people 
from Tabriz had been cheated everywhere. No one recommends traveling to Baku with your personal car 
since most probably the police would stop the car asking for bribes, and if one resists, he may get a large fine 
without having broken any laws. 
Nation-building influences Azerbaijani people both in the north and south: Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, new political discourses have arisen in all the emerging republics emphasizing cultural norms, 
values and locality. This suggests that the development of the new nations and states in the area involves the 
reconstruction of cultural, political and ethnic space, which is a characteristic of the twentieth century nation-
state formation. In case of the Republic of Azerbaijan we could track the nation-building process in 
manipulating their language, dominance of ethnic Azerbaijani citizens of the nation and being anti-Armenian 
as the main symbols of national identity building in post-Soviet Azerbaijan.  
In Iran, the cultural rights and political activities of the ethnic minorities has been severely oppressed 
for a long time. In the absence of mainstream distinct political movements, it is difficult to gather all Iranian 
Azerbaijanis under one united definition. In an anthropological approach, I asked some elderly Iranian 
Azerbaijanis how often their everyday life was affected by Azerbaijani identity in the early years of Islamic 
Revolution and during the 8 years of Iran-Iraq war period. Most ordinary Azerbaijani ethnic citizens, either 
in Tehran or in Tabriz, described themselves as under the full influence of Iranian nationality. Especially 
during wartime, Azerbaijani soldiers and commodores fought bravely and gained lots of praise from the 
government. The war helped the sense of Azerbaijani identity merge with Iranian national identity.   
Iranian Azerbaijanis have played an active role in both the process of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and 
during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). In this era, the Iranian government used the concept of defending the 
nation against Iraqi invasion to create a national identity for all Iranians, regardless of their ethnicity. 
However, after the new independent Azerbaijan was established, Iranian Azerbaijanis took a different 
attitude towards this new political situation. Some political groups gained power through the support from 
north Azerbaijan and nationalistic movements. I interviewed some elderly nonpolitical citizens to explore 
their perception on their national identity. Many of the interviewees didn’t feel that Azerbaijan needs to be 
independent from Iran; however, they believe that their right to learn their mother tongue at school should be 
recognized by the Iranian government. Some others felt that nothing had changed for them as an Iranian 
Azerbaijani. They never thought of joining the northern part since they believe that the land had belonged to 
them for a long time and they are quite comfortable in the current situation.  
As mentioned in this paper, although Azerbaijanis in Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan do not have 
such a good relationship in their daily contacts in recent years, some nationalistic movements have grown 
among Iranian Azerbaijanis. However, their situation has changed dramatically over recent years. Two 
decades ago most Azerbaijanis might have preferred to speak Persian even in Tabriz, but the use of 
Azerbaijani language has now become commonplace, displacing Persian in most of the predominantly 
Azerbaijani areas of northwestern Iran. Ordinary Azerbaijanis in Tehran and elsewhere do not hesitate to 
speak in their native tongue, showing pride in their ethnic identity. Importantly, demonstrations for ethno-
linguistic rights have become more frequent in Iranian Azerbaijan. Although they are often violently 
suppressed by the police, with the demonstrators routinely subjected to imprisonment, they still continue. 
Separatist flags of Southern Azerbaijan are occasionally displayed visibly overnight in Tabriz and other 
cities of Iran’s Azerbaijan, along with posters advocating Azerbaijanis right to education in their native 
tongue. Some specialists like Atabaki (1993:182) have claimed that Iranian Azerbaijani speakers have lost 
their identity among Iranians, especially in recent years. 
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As a result of the imposed restrictions on any politicized expression of Azerbaijani identity, the focus of 
Azerbaijanis has since shifted to the realm of sports. The Tabriz-based Tractor-Sazi football club has earned 
massive support of ethnic Azerbaijanis across Iran, breaking all nationwide attendance records. Many 
thousands of Azerbaijani fans accompany the Tractor-Sazi football team to its matches, occasionally waving 
Azerbaijani flags and shouting politically-flavored slogans ranging from moderate demands to establishing 
school teaching in Azerbaijani, to emphasize on their distinct ethnicity:  
“Haray, Haray men Turkem; Azerbaijan bizim di, Afghanistan sizin di” (Hey, lookout, I am 
Turkish”; “Azerbaijan is ours, Afghanistan is yours), explicitly supporting Azerbaijani separatism: 
“Yashasin Azerbaijan, Kor olsun dushmanimiz; Tabriz, Baki, Ankara, biz hara farslar hara?” 
(Long live Azerbaijan and down with those who dislike us, Tabriz, Baku, Ankara – our path is 
different than that of the Persians).  
This, in turn, has contributed to growing tensions with the Persian fans, whose racist slur  of  “Torke 
Khar” (Turkish donkey) is returned by Azerbaijani fans: “Fars dili, it dili” (Persian dogs), which often 
results in violent clashes, especially during Tractor-Sazi’s matches with Teheran-based teams, Persepolis 
and Esteghlal. On 27 July 2010, following a match marked by mutual rounds of racial insults, Tractor-Sazi 
football club’s Azerbaijani fans engaged in violent clashes with the ethnic Persian fans of the Tehran-based 
Persepolis football team and Iranian police. During the clashes, dozens of fans were injured, and police jailed 
dozens of predominantly Azerbaijani fans. Concerned over the dramatically growing scope of Azerbaijani 
nationalism aired during Tractor-Sazi games, the authorities started to limit the number of predominantly 
Azerbaijani supporters that were allowed to attend the games (Souleimanov, 2011). 
Mass demonstrations by ethnic Azerbaijanis protesting the drying up of Lake Urmia in northwestern 
Iran, the Middle East’s largest water reservoir and the third largest saltwater lake in the world, recently 
struck the cities of Iranian Azerbaijan. Environmental protests have been on the rise since August 2011 
following the Iranian parliament’s refusal to accept an emergency rescue plan for reviving Lake Urmia, a 
lake that has the status of a UNESCO biosphere reserve. Regardless of the environmental issue, political 
secessionist and nationalist movements are using Lake Urmia and Tractor-Sazi club issues to make their 
point. 
Conclusion  
As discussed in the first part about the various forms of “otherness” for the three different Turkish 
ethnicities, it appears that there are three different ethnicities in differing geographical areas. The “others” 
for the Republic of Azerbaijan are Armenians; for Iranian Azerbaijanis they are Persians, and for Turkish 
citizens they are Kurds and Westerners.  
One may object to this argument claiming that the same situation applies to Kurds in nearby areas, as 
they are surrounded by Persians, Arabs and Turks. Therefore, they also might be interpreted as having four 
different ethnicities of Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurds, Turkish Kurds and Syrian Kurds. I will respond that 
Kurds were not separated for a long period of time. Since the Republic of Azerbaijan for a long time was 
under the territory of the Soviet Union, it was totally separated from the main diaspora in Iran and those in 
Turkey; they have lost many cultural ties with the other areas. Thus, nowadays, it is doubtful that by sharing 
the same history and language, Azerbaijani-speaking people from Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turks of Turkey may 
still share the same ethnic identity under different political governance. Kurds, however, have always 
preserved their unity during different regimes in each of these four countries. Moreover, unlike the 
Azerbaijanis, Kurds have a hero leader, Abdullah Ojalan, currently in jail in Turkey, who is respected by all 
Kurds of those areas. Also, all of “others” for Kurds are non-friendly to them all, whether they are Persian, 
Turk, or Arab of Iraq or former Syria; Kurds are fighting in all four fronts. However, in the case of 
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Azerbaijani people, Armenians live in peace in Tabriz while they are considered enemies in northern 
Azerbaijan; northern Azerbaijanis do not hate Kurds or Persians.  
The other reason is the geopolitical situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
The border between these two areas in most parts is a river called Aras, which is quite wide and deep, 
making it very difficult to illegally cross the border. However, Kurdish areas consist of hills, rocks and caves 
which make it easy to commute illegally between the borders and establish some militias to cooperate in the 
fight against four different countries.  
To explain the currently powerful nationalistic movement in northwest of Iran, especially in Tabriz, one 
can relate to Stuart Hall’s theory of constructionism. Constructionism does not dictate one single approach 
towards the study of ethnicity and nationalism. Constructionists in general, however, put emphasis on 
contingency and the flux of ethnic and national identities. They perceive ethnicity and nationalism within the 
realm of social and political processes, as a product of human agency and a creative social act. If 
primordialism sees ethnicity and national identity as natural, fixed, homogenous and inevitable, 
constructionism perceives ethnic and national identities as contingent, heterogeneous, and subject to change, 
as the product of human interaction, history and politics (Hall 1990). 
As it was discussed, being under the governance of different states has affected south and north 
Azerbaijanis differently. Therefore, there is a vast gap in the perception of different nationalist groups about 
a united Azerbaijani nation and the ordinary people’s viewpoints in the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey 
about becoming a united nation. People in their everyday lives are complaining that the “other” brothers and 
sisters are cheating on them, and their own nationality and their own people are much better than the others. 
In this situation, nationalistic movements among Iranian Azerbaijanis do not seem to help with building a 
united Azerbaijan and secessionism, but appear as a movement against the central government in the hope of 
gaining some basic rights for the Azerbaijani ethnic minorities.  
While people in these two territories do not trust each other and do not accept the other one as “us”, 
how could one define these people as belonging to the same ethnicity? It may be the time to redefine our 
perception that the same ethnicity is not based on sharing the same history but rather on contemporary 
culture. Living a long time under the rule of the Soviet Union versus Iranian governance, Azerbaijani people 
are no longer the same; thus we can define two Azerbaijani ethnicities. The concept of ethnicity is fluid and 
subject to change; beyond a shared language and past history, it’s difficult to find other cultural and political 
similarities between the two groups especially among the younger generations. 
Nationalistic movements, nowadays, are using Azerbaijan and Turkish flags to invite people to 
demonstrate against the current Iranian regime. However, the people and government of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey seem to be reluctant to support these movements. Therefore, nationalistic 
movements, as Hall points out, are thinking in the primordialism way. Some argue that Azerbaijan is one 
nation since people share the same language and ancient, not contemporary, history. However, Azerbaijan is 
no longer a single entity. The contemporary culture, social situation, politics and everyday life of people in 
these two countries are far different. Taking the constructionism view, we might redefine a new identity to 
these two currently different nations. By accepting that people in these two areas do not like and trust the 
“others”, and their cultural roots and political trends have developed differently over a long period of time, 
we may split the Azerbaijani ethnicity into two different groups who are not the same ethnicity anymore: 
Iranian Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijanis. 
Acknowledgement 
I am grateful for the constructive comments and editing provided by Professor Nader Ghotbi and Professor A. 
Mani from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU) who read the initial draft and helped with its revision.  
 153 
 
 
A comparative study of ethnic identity among Azerbaijani speakers in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
 
References 
Aliyeva, Lala. 2013. Vernacular Islam in Azerbaijan. Humanities and Social Sciences Review 2(3): 145-151. 
Atabaki, Touraj. 1993. Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Authority in Twentieth Century Iran. London. British Academic Press. 
Berger, Peter L. and Huntington, Samuel P. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cheung, Y. W. 1993. Approaches to ethnicity: Clearing roadblocks in the study of ethnicity and substance 
abuse. International Journal of Addictions 28(12): 1209-1226 
Fanon, Frantz. 1967. Black skin, white Masks. New York, Grove Press: 111-112. 
Hall, Stuart. 1990. Cultural Identity and Diaspora. in “Identity: Community, Culture, Difference”. Ed. Rutherford, 
Jonathan. London. Lawrence & Wishart. 
-------. 1996. Questions of Cultural Identity. in “Ethnicity: Identity and Difference”. Ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. 
London. Sage Publications. 
Hammond, P. 1988. Religion and the persistence of identity.  Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27(1): 1-11. 
Hong, Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Benet-Martinez, V. 2000. Multicultural minds: A dynamic constructivist 
approach to culture and cognition. American Psychologist  55: 709-720. 
Kasravi, Ahmad. 1946. Azeri ya zabane bastane mardome Azerbaijan (in Persian). Tehran. Iran. 
Matthews, Mervyn. 1989. Party, State, and Citizen in the Soviet Union: A Collection of Documents. 1989: 189-214.  
People, James and Bailey, Garrick. 2010. Humanity: An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (9th ed.). Wadsworth 
Cengage learning: 389.  
 “Population of Azerbaijan (statistical bulletin) 2015”.  The state statistical committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Retrieved from:  http://www.stat.gov.az/source/demoqraphy/ap/indexen.php (accessed June 4, 2015). 
Safizadeh, Fereydoun. 1998. On dilemmas of identity in the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Caucasian Regional 
Studies  3(1): 1–19. 
------ .2013. The Dynamics of Ethnic Identity in Iranian Azerbaijan. The Journal of Pedagogy, Pluralism and Practice 
5(1).  
Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York. Vintage Books: 3-7. 
Shaffer, Brenda. 2002. Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. MIT Press. 
Smith, Anthony 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. 
Souleimanov, Emil. 2011. The Evolution of Azerbaijani Identity and the Prospects of Secessionism in Iranian 
Azerbaijan.  The Quarterly Journal 11(1):77-84. 
Swietochowski, Tadeusz. 1995. Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. Columbia University Press: 69, 
133.  
Tiankui, Jing; Sasaki, Masamichi and Peilin, Li .2013. Social Change in the Age of Globalization. Leiden: Koninklijki 
Brill NV. Volume 5(1). 
 
 
